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INHERIT THE MYTH: HOW WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN'S STRUGGLE WITH SOCIAL DARWINISM AND
LEGAL FORMALISM DEMYTHOLOGIZE THE SCOPES
MONKEY TRIAL
KEVIN P. LEE*
The trial of John T. Scopes is an important milestone in the history of
American legal thought. Known in the vernacular as the "Scopes Monkey
Trial," the case took place in Dayton, Tennessee in the summer of 1925.1
It concerned a substitute high school biology teacher who was arrested and
convicted for teaching evolutionary theory in violation of a Tennessee anti-
evolution act.2 At the time, the trial was the most public confrontation
between religious fundamentalism and modem science. By 1955, Jerome
Lawrence and Robert E. Lee had written a play about the trial called
Inherit the Wind,3 and film treatments of that play followed.4 These
fictionalized accounts helped to create a mythic view of the case in popular
culture. Today, the case is usually seen as a fable that cautions against the
dangers of religious establishment.5
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Many books have been written on the Scopes Trial. For a short summary of the
historical background, see EDWARD CAUDILL ET AL., THE SCOPES TRIAL: A PHOTOGRAPHIC
HISTORY (2000).
2 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (1927). For the full text of the Act, see The
Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 27.
3 JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955).
4 INHERIT THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1960); INHERIT THE WIND (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer 1999).
5 See, e.g., EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND
AMERICA'S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION 225-46 (1997); PAUL K.
CONKIN, WHEN ALL THE GODS TREMBLED: DARWINISM, SCOPES, AND AMERICAN
INTELLECTUALS 98-108 (1998).
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This interpretation of the case, however, omits key facts. Most
importantly, the motivations of the Christian fundamentalists in seeking to
ban the teaching of evolution must be questioned beyond the commonplace
myth because, prior to the turn of the twentieth centu7 , fundamentalists
voiced no opposition to Darwin's evolutionary theory. It was after the
First World War and after the legal environment for the poor and labor had
been transformed through the rising tide of legal formalism that the
fundamentalists began to reject theories of evolution.7 Without such
crucial historical facts, the case appears to convey a simple and clear
polemical message: fundamentalism ignores reason, and evolutionary
theory is scientific, rational, and progressive. When one considers the
complaints that the fundamentalists had against evolutionary theory, the
popular account of the case seems at best incomplete.
This Article argues that a more thoroughgoing analysis of the history
of the case, and especially the role of William Jennings Bryan, who was a
leader of the fundamentalists' anti-evolution efforts, is needed to correct
the distorted view of the popular understanding. As some historians have
noted,8 the case took place in a period when the theory of social evolution
that is associated with Herbert Spencer deeply influenced social thought.9
Spencer's philosophy of social evolution would later come to be called
Social Darwinism, although its connections to Charles Darwin are largely
illusory. 10 It was Social Darwinism, not Darwin's theory of evolution
through natural selection, that influenced intellectual thought in a variety
of areas by providing a philosophical basis for the laissez-faire economics
that was characteristic of American social thought after the Civil War and
well into the 1920s. I1
The influence that the philosophy of Herbert Spencer had on the
development of legal theory has been given less consideration. By the
1920s, there had been a series of cases in which the courts sought to
promote "individualism as a moral and economic ideal."' 12 For many
jurists during this period, law came to be seen as a means for maintaining
6 See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY, MODERN SCHISM: THREE PATHS TO THE SECULAR
(1969).
7 See discussion infra Part ll.B.
8 See, e.g., CONKIN, supra note 5, at 43.
9 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: 1860-
1915 21, 32-33 (1944); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT
AGAINST FORMALISM 11 (1957).
10 For a discussion of the differences between Social Darwinism and Charles
Darwin's theory of evolution, see discussion infra pp. 352-56.
" WHITE, supra note 9, passim.
12 NEIL DuXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 26,30-32 (1997).
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private ownership and contractual rights.' 3 Courts sought to apply formal
legal principles without regard to inequalities that might exist in the
distribution of power and wealth in society.14 Moreover, any governmental
actions that would disturb existing distributions of property ownership or
interfere with freedom of contract were viewed as arbitrarily partisan and
working against the moral advancement of society.' 5 These actions were
particularly detrimental to working class persons and to organized labor.'
6
In case after case, the courts struck down attempts to guarantee labor rights
that interfered with or limited freedom of contract.' 7 The legal thought of
this period of ridged legalism has come to be called "Classical Legal
Thought" or "Legal Formalism."'
8
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, fundamentalists such
as William Jennings Bryan were largely neutral toward evolutionary
theory.' 9 Some fundamentalists became suspicious of it, however, as they
saw the effects that Social Darwinism was reaping for the working class
and the poor.20 As the plight of exploited workers grew deeper in the face
of the near imperial presence of industrial magnets, fundamentalists such
as Bryan became distrustful of evolutionary theory, eventually leading to
outright hostility by the end of the First World War.2 1 After the war, Bryan
viewed Spencer's evolutionary theory as part and parcel with German
scientism, and its place in American social thought as a pernicious
influence. He viewed the nascent German biblical scholarship of the late
nineteenth century, which sought to modernize Biblical hermeneutics by
applying historical-critical methods, as an attempt to secularize scripture
by using science to rob it of its spiritual content.2 In all of this, Bryan fed
on the rampant anti-German sentiments of the day, giving birth to an anti-
evolution movement that did not see a clear separation between Darwin's
theory of speciation through natural selection and Social Darwinism's
claims of moral progress through free market competition. Seen from this
perspective then, the Scopes case illustrates the frustration that labor
supporters were feeling during the period following the First World War,
13 See discussion infra pp. 356-57.
14 See discussion infra Part I.B.
15 See discussion infra pp. 360-61.
16 See discussion infra pp. 360-61.
17 See discussion infra pp. 360-61.
18 See discussion infra p. 353.
19 LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN:
THE LAST DECADE, 1915-1925 260-64 (1965).
20 See discussion infra Part II.A.
21 See discussion infra Part II.B.
22 See discussion infra pp. 367-69.
23 See discussion infra pp. 367-69.
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and how that frustration was fueled by post-war anti-German mania to
ignite a reactionary movement against the teaching of evolutionary theory.
By placing the Scopes case in the proper context, the role of Social
Darwinism, the development of legal formalism, and a richer
understanding of the history of fundamentalist social criticism prove to be
powerful correctives to the confused and incomplete mythic version of the
case perpetuated by the dramatic representations of it. This Article seeks
to begin the process of demythologizing the case by presenting a more
complete understanding of the historical background.
I. AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT: 1860S TO 1930s
The anti-evolution act under which John T. Scopes was convicted
proscribed teaching a belief "that denies the story of the divine creation of
man as taught in the Bible. 24 Scopes was accused of teaching the theory
of evolution developed by Charles Darwin.25 The Darwinian theory was
not, however, the only theory of evolution that existed at the time, nor was
it the most influential. 6 There was, in fact, a long history of evolutionary
theories dating back at least to the eighteenth century. Many philosophers
and natural scientists speculated on the nature of change in societies and
individual organisms, offered theories about the mechanism of change, and
hypothesized about the moral significance of gradual development. One
theory in particular, that of Herbert Spencer, was deeply influential in
American social thought in antebellum America27 and remained so at the
time of the Scopes trial. Spencer's theory had become an accepted view
among social scientists28 and had helped to create the legal thought of the
age. Most notably, Spencer's view played a formative role in the infamous
Supreme Court decision in Lochner v. New York,29 which articulated the
view of freedom of contract that would survive well into the 1930s. 30 This
case would have a direct influence on the outcome of the Scopes case.
A. Evolutionary Theory in American Social Thought
Evolutionary theory appears to have come to the United States with the
force of a cannonball at the close of the Civil War.31 During that period of
rapid industrialization and colonial expansion, many American
24 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363-64 n.1 (1927).
25 See CONKIN, supra note 5, at 83.
26 See discussion infra pp. 350-56.
27 HOFSTADTER, supra note 9, at 19-22.
28 ROBERT J. RICHARDS, DARwIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES
OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR 244-46 (1987).
29 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30 Id. at 53-54, 57-64; see also discussion infra pp. 360-61.
31 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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intellectuals viewed free markets as a moral force and an economic ideal.32
The laissez-faire ideal held that free markets would exercise a selective
force in such a way that gradual progress toward a more efficient and
moral society would result.33  Eventually, it found support and
encouragement by the Victorian evolutionary theorist, Herbert Spencer.
34
Even before the Victorian era, however, various theories of gradual, but
inexorable human progress, playing out through the workings of natural
forces, were forwarded by philosophers and natural scientists. 5 The belief
in a mechanism of gradual change over time had been "in the air" so to
speak, for quite some time.36
In the eighteenth century, philosophers attempted to articulate the basis
for an understanding of biological change occurring through the forces of
nature.37 Although one finds a tantalizing reference in Hume's Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion,38 a more developed conceptualization
32 Id. at 21-22.
33 See WHITE, supra note 9, at 32-47.
34 See id. at 11, 39.
35 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 9, at 1-2.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION (Prometheus Books
1989) (1779). Hume seems to have come close to the notion of natural selection as he
described, in a Socratic dialogue, a position with which he disagreed that seems to
anticipate evolutionary theory:
Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You
will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an
infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions
to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and
explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts,
are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into
admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious
adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly,
though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of
human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of
analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is
somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger
faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has
executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone,
do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to
human mind and intelligence.
Id. at 27.
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appears in Immanuel Kant's thought. For example, in his essay, Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Kant writes, "All of a
creature's natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in
conformity with their end," and that "[i]n man (as the sole rational creature
on earth) those natural capacities directed toward the use of his reason are
to be completely developed only in the species, not in the individual., 39 It
is clear in this essay that Kant views history as a gradual progress of
creatures toward their ends (Zwecken), and human history as a gradual
progress toward a complete and universal rationality (and thereby to Kant's
moral ideal, the kingdom of ends).40 For Kant, it is the human species as a
whole that advances toward a unity of rational intention (the good will). 41
In this early example of Kant's thought, then, a unity of human purposes
and intuition will come about through the operation of the forces of
nature.42
As Kant explains in To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,
written late in his life, the forces of nature are as coercive and violent as
they are unavoidable.43 It is therefore learning to manage and confine
nature that is a necessary condition for the rule of reason.44 This claim sets
out an "ontology of violence" wherein Kant sees essential forces in nature
that guide humanity toward an end that would unite social groups in a
common will.45 As Hannah Arendt put it, "[tihis is 'world history,' seen in
analogy to the organic development of the individual-childhood,
adolescence, maturity.
46
Kant's belief in the gradual maturing of the human species was taken
up by Herbert Spencer and incorporated into a theory of social evolution in
39 IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent
(1784), in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 30 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)
(emphasis omitted).
40 Id. at 31.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 39.
44 See id. at 129.
45 See id. at 127-29. John Milbank developed the position that modernity is
inescapably committed to an ontology of violence that is fundamentally at odds with the
Christian ontology of peace. JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND
SECULAR REASON 278-80 (1990).
46 HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 8 (Ronald Beiner
ed., 1982).
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his systematic treatise, Social Statics, first published in 1851. This
publication was so widely influential that some historians argue that it
helped to establish the social thought of the United States for an entire
generation.48 One gets some idea of how ripe the times were for a theory
for progress through struggle from the experience of the young Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was wounded three times during the Civil
War.49 Three months into his service with the Twentieth Massachusetts
Regiment, Holmes was wounded in the chest at Ball's Bluff.50 He was
nearly killed at Antietam Creek when he suffered a bullet wound in the
neck, and, at Chancellorsville, he took a musket ball in the heel.51 As
Holmes lay recovering from his third wound, he read Spencer's Social
52Statics. In Spencer, Holmes saw a great revolution in thought, once
claiming that he doubted that "any writer of English except Darwin has
done so much to affect our whole way of thinking about the universe." 53
It is important to recognize, however, that Spencer's theory is distinct
from Darwin's. 4 Spencer was most concerned with social change, and it
was this concern that would lead to his theory eventually being given the
name "Social Darwinism. ''55 However, one ought not to be confused by
the term. There were many fundamental differences between Darwin and
Spencer.56 Most notable, perhaps, was that Spencer viewed natural
selection as a Rrogressive force, tending toward increasing complexity and
moral growth.
Spencer believed that societies evolve progressively according to
moral laws of nature.58 The two principles that guide moral development
he called the "greatest happiness principle" and the "principle of equal
freedom." 59 According to the first principle, an individual's happiness
47 See HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN
HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation 1970) (1851).
48 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 9, at 36.
49 See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 43 (2000).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 45.
53 Id. at 49.
54 For a brief introduction to Spencer's life and thought, see RICHARDS, supra note
28, at 243-313.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 255.
58 Id. at 258.
59 Id.
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consists in the free exercise of all the individual's faculties, and therefore
the principle dictates that restrictions among faculties are to be minimized
and overall freedom of expression is to be maximized. 6° Note that Spencer
views happiness in Aristotelian terms. The second principle holds that a
society's happiness is dependent upon the proportionate functioning of all
its constitutive parts. 6' This second principle demands that no one part of a
society gains the control over the rest.62 For Spencer, a person "must have
liberty to do all that his faculties naturally impel him to do."63 Since God
wills human happiness, all persons have a natural right to liberty, and since
this right applies to all, it can only be limited by others exercising their
freedom. 64 The only legitimate function of the state, for Spencer, is the
protection of the equal property and contract rights of all. 6p If the state
attempts to do more, "it necessarily infringe[s] on the rights of some in
order to give unfair advantage to others."'66
Against this view, Darwin argued that evolutionary change serves no
transcendent moral purpose.67 Its goal or end is not the metaphysical good
or right.68 It is simply survival of the species through adaptive advantage.69
Darwin viewed natural selection as merely a force tending to bring about
greater adaptation of a species to its environment. 70 He was even reluctant
to call his theory of descent with modification a theory of "evolution"
because he feared that the progressive implications of the term would be
misleading.71 In the end, however, he reluctantly adopted the term, in part
because Spencer had already popularized it.
72
Darwin's theory has grown in respect over the years as Spencer's has
declined,73 but many people still confuse the two theories, usually with
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 SPENCER, supra note 47, at 69.
64 Id. at 102.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARwN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL
HISTORY 24-25 (1977).
68 See id.
69 Id. at 45.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 36.
72 Id.
73 See RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 243.
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heinous consequences.74 On the confusion between Spencer and Darwin,
Stephen Jay Gould writes:
This discredited theory ranked human groups and cultures
according to their assumed level of evolutionary
attainment, with (not surprisingly) white Europeans at the
top and people dwelling in their conquered colonies at the
bottom. Today, it remains a primary component of our
global arrogance, our belief in dominion over, rather than
fellowship with, more than a million other species that
inhabit our planet. The moving finger has written, of
course, and nothing can be done; yet I am rather sorry that
scientists contributed to a fundamental misunderstanding
by selecting a vernacular word meaning progress as a
name for Darwin's less eughonious but more accurate
"descent with modification."
Due in no small part to this confusion, Darwin's theory, when it was
published in 1859, gave great credence to Spencer's. Together the two
theories seemed to reinforce each other, creating an intellectual climate that
saw great promise in theories of unencumbered progressive evolution.76
74 For a discussion of some abuses of Social Darwinism, see generally STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996).
75 GOULD, supra note 67, at 37-38.
76 See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's 87 (1950).
At this juncture, the evolutionary philosophies of Darwin and Spencer
saved the day. They answered, almost miraculously, the needs of their
generation. Although at first they seemed to threaten the very
foundations of traditional belief, a more mature appreciation of their
meaning-[John] Fiske's, for example-discovered that the substitution
of evolution for the Scriptures or for Reason derogated neither from the
sovereignty of the Supreme Lawgiver nor from the majesty of the laws.
The doctrines of evolution certified a universe governed by Law and the
progressive destiny of Man, not on the basis of fallible Reason nor on
mere intuition but by the irreproachable findings of science. ...
Morality itself was furnished, for the first time, with a scientific
foundation. Reason and intuition had wrestled vainly with the problem
of evil in a universe logically or ideally good; evolution made the
problem irrelevant, for evil, which was now seen to be but a
maladjustment to nature, was destined inevitably to disappear in that
larger harmony which was good.
20041
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William Graham Sumner, who in 1872 was given a post as a professor
of Political and Social Science at Yale University, was one early proponent
of Social Darwinism. 77 He used this teaching position as a vehicle for
promoting his synthesis of Spencerian and Darwinian evolutionary
thought.7  For Sumner, unrestricted competition was central to continued
development of a free society.79 In an 1879 lecture, he criticized those who
were fearful of his vision:
Many of them are frightened at liberty, especially under
the form of competition, which they elevate into a
bugbear. They think it bears harshly on the weak. They do
not perceive that here "the strong" and "the weak" are
terms which admit of no definition unless they are made
equivalent to the industrious and the idle, the frugal and
the extravagant. They do not perceive, furthermore, that if
we do not like the survival of the fittest, we have only one
possible alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest.
The former is the law of civilization; the latter is the law of
anti-civilization.80
For Sumner and many like him, civilization is, at its base, a battle for
survival. 81 What matters to civilization is not the individual, not the
77 HOFSTADTER, supra note 9, at 39.
78 See id. at 39-40.
79 Id. at 43.
80. Id. (quoting 2 ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 56 (Albert Galloway Keller
& Maurice R. Davie eds., 1934)).
81 See COMMAGER, supra note 76, at 88. Commager described the influence of the
theory as follows:
For evolution, operating remorselessly through cosmic laws, promised
ultimate perfection, to be sure, it was a perfection to which man made
and could make no independent contribution. Though it seemed at first
glance far from exacting in its demands, it imposed in the end a price
higher than that required even by Calvinism-the logical abandonment
of free will. For having pushed God back to a first cause and denied
Him the privilege, so carefully safeguarded by the Calvinists, of being
arbitrary, it proceeded to remove man from the controls, to reduce him
to a passive element in nature rather than an active agent in working out
his own salvation. By subjecting the destinies of man to the inexorable
operations of natural selection, it vetoed man's interposition and
nullified his own efforts. Progress was sure, but the price was
submission and conformity.
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coercion or oppression of persons, but the unknowable intentions of a
heartless nature that guides the species to an inexorable end. 2
With advocates like Sumner, social evolutionary theory became a
powerful cultural force. In economics, it justified the rise of John D.
Rockefeller, who monopolized the nation's oil industry. 3 In foreign
policy, it legitimated a policy of might makes right.84 In law, it justified
the mechanical application of abstract legal principles, blind to their social
effect.85 G. Edward White suggests, "Judges began their decisions by
making verbal distinctions, defining concepts in useful ways. They then
pronounced their definitions as axiomatic. 86  In seeking to protect the
"liberty" to compete in the social battle for the "survival of the fittest," the
law became increasingly concerned with maintaining and defending
property and contract rights.8 7
Spencer's theory of gradual social progress thus became the context
for theories of social control and development.88 Laissez-faire economists
and assorted "men of affairs" who objected to any form of governmental
intervention found in Spencer's writings a philosophy (or pseudo-
philosophy) that justified their position.8 9  Neil Duxbury suggests,
"Swayed by evolutionary economics, late nineteenth-century American
public figures and policy-makers were on the whole convinced that the
economy was fated to rise and fall at regular intervals in accordance with
the natural laws of the market." 9
B. Social Darwinism and the Law
In the nineteenth century, a distinctively American form of legal
thought developed known as Classical Legal Theory9' or Legal
Formalism. 92 The rise of this form of legal theory was associated with theprofessionalization of the practice of law and the origins of American legal
82 See id.
83 See Louis W. KOENIG, BRYAN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN 606-07 (1971).
14 Id.
85 G. EDWARD WHITE, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism; Jurisprudence
and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 99, 105 (1978).
16 Id. at 101.
87 Id. at 100-07.
8 See WHITE, supra note 9, at 246.
89 See id. at 37-38; DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 28-29.
90 DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 29.
91 See MORTON J. HORWIrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3-6 (1992).
92 See DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 10-11.
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education. 93 It was also part of the larger trend to elevate social thought in
the United States by making it more similar to the natural sciences. The
goal of Formalism during this period was to make law a science, and
lawyers and judges professional experts with "a scientific knowledge" of
their subject.95 Law was viewed as "scientific" inasmuch as it was
regulated by formal principles that were rulemaking and regular in
character. To make law a science required that the irregularities that arise
through the political processes be limited to the greatest extent possible.
According to Morton J. Horwitz, the desire to make law a science
resulted in part from a debate concerning the nature of the relationship
between law and politics. 96 At issue in this debate was the proper role for
the courts in restraining the democratic legislatures of the states from the
threat of "tyranny of the majority. 97 Horwitz explains that at the center of
this debate was a concern about the dangers of faction, which Madison had
described in The Federalist.98 Madison stated that "the most common and
durable source of factions had been the various and unequal distribution of
property." 99 Madison recognized that in a democracy, a strong tendency
would exist to achieve equality through coercive measures unjustly
imposed by the majority on the wealthy minority.' ° The advocates of
codification saw the promulgation of legal codes, as distinct from common
law judges, as providing clear and certain legal principles that were
separated from the political processes, thus acting as a buffer between the
individual property owner and the political majority.101 This process began
in the years following the Revolutionary War'02 and culminated with the
founding of professional schools for lawyers in the mid-nineteenth
century. I
In education, Formalism's clearest promoter and defender was
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first dean of Harvard Law School. 1°4
He had been a New York lawyer prior to his appointment to the newly
93 Id. at 24-25.
94 See generally WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994).
95 Cf. JOSEPH H. BEAL, I A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1935).
96 See HORWrIZ, supra note 91, at 9.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 12-13.
104 Id. at 13.
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created post,10 5 and his experience as a practitioner shaped his view of the
law, giving him a deep respect for stare decisis.'0 6 His experience also led
him to realize that most lawyers relied on only a limited number of
cases. 10 7 He surmised that if only a few cases were needed to grasp the
relevant legal principles, then the number of fundamental principles must
be limited. 08 As he saw it, the task of the lawyer and judge is to discern
these few fundamental legal principles in the reported cases, determine
their relation, and apply them to the actual cases before them. 0 9 He
developed the case study method to inculcate in the novice law student the
skills of inductive reasoning and respect for stare decisis that would serve
him in the profession." 0 Langdell's conception of law and legal education
was remarkably successful. By 1900, Legal Formalism was taught by the
case method nearly uniformly in all the law schools in the United States."'
For jurists, however, Formalism took on a more explicitly Spenserian
caste.12 This was nowhere more obvious than in the doctrine of freedom
of contract developed by the Supreme Court over an extended period. As
early as 1897, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,'" the Court defined the term
"liberty" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.114
105 Id. at 15.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
III See James Brook, A Comment on Style: The Elevator as Metaphor, 30 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 548-49, 555 (1985) (commenting on remarks given by Professor Chase at New
York Law School's Symposium on Legal Education). New York Law School was one
small refuge that preferred commentaries over casebooks. Id. at 555-56 n.32.
112 See DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 28; WHIT, supra note 9, at 37-38.
113 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
114 Id. at 589.
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This conceptualization of liberty is consonant with Madison's concerns
about the power of faction. It views liberty as being furthered in society by
protecting contract as a private law sphere that could act as a buffer
between the individual and the political majority.1" 5 It also is Spencerian
in as much as it effectively excluded government from regulating the
private sphere so created.! 16 One historian observes that "[b]y drawing a
sharp distinction between public and private, and by opposing state
regulation of private economic relations, the courts were effectively saying
that the market governed itself."'1 7 In seeking to protect the "liberty" to
compete in the social battle for the "survival of the fittest," the law became
increasingly concerned with maintaining and defending property and
contract rights. ll  This was the legal component of the laissez-faire
economics that Veblan and others advanced. 1 9
This laissez-faire approach to contract reached its zenith in the case of
Lochner v. New York,12in which the Supreme Court declared that a New
York statute limiting the number of hours that a baker may work in a week
to sixty was unconstitutional because it interfered with the bakers' freedom
to contract for labor on whatever terms they deemed fit.121 Lochner again
revealed the Social Darwinist theory of limited government by asserting
that government, especially in exercising its police powers, must be limited
in its legitimate exercise of power to protecting those individual rights that
enhance the "total" public good. 22 Such rights were conceived of as an
amalgam of the aggregate welfare of individuals and furtherance of
conventional morality. 1 2 The Court again conceived of liberty in terms of
the private rights of contract.' 24  Statutes that sought to redistribute
economic and political arrangements were perceived by the Court to be
unprincipled and depended upon partisan judicial activism. 125
The Lochner Court sought to satisfy both of Spencer's principles of
moral progress. The "greatest happiness" principle is furthered by
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 30.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 10-11.
120 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
121 See id. at 64. For a discussion of the historical significance of the case, see
generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
122 See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-4, at 438-39
(1978).
123 See id. § 8-4, at 439 n.6.
124 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
125 See id. at 55-56, 63-64.
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attempting to maximize the expression of societal difference, 26 and the
"principle of equal freedom" is furthered by limiting government's ability
to limit or ameliorate the consequences of societal differences. 27 In the
context of the Lochner case, the greatest happiness principle demands that
the Court protect the rights of the bakers to freely enter into contracts with
their employers because bakers are of full legal capacity and, in the words
of the Court, are "in no sense wards of the State.' 28 Thus, the greatest
happiness, in the sense of maximizing the expression of individual
capabilities, was furthered by the Court's approach. The Court also
furthered the principle of equal freedom by putting sharp limits on the
government's ability to act for the benefit of those who could not protect
themselves in the marketplace. 129 Attempting to assist those who were
disadvantaged in the marketplace was seen as a partisan subsidy. 130
II. RELIGIOUS RESPONSES TO SOCIAL DARWINISM
A. Fundamentalist Reaction to Evolutionary Theory Before the First
World War
Initially, fundamentalists did not oppose evolutionary theory.' 31 There
was already present among many American Protestants a belief that
religion needs to find the means to accept modem science. 132 George
Marsden argues that when Darwinism was brought to the Americas, it was
secular science that became hostile to religion, as evidenced by the
vigorous promotion by scientists of the metaphor of a war between science
and religious doctrine in books such as Andrew Dixon White's two-
volume, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in
Christendom, 133 published in 1896.1 4
Among religious communities in America, the reaction to the growing
influence of Social Darwinism was divided.1 35 Liberal Protestants tended
to believe that it was necessary for Christianity to re-formulate theology to
126 SPENCER, supra note 47, at 6-7.
127 Id. at 175-76, 184-85.
128 Id. at 57.
129 See id. at 59-60.
130 See id.
131 See generally MARTY, supra note 6.
132 See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND
EVANGELICALISM 139-41 (1991).
133 ANDREW D. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN
CHRISTENDOM (George Braziller 1955) (1896).
134 MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 139-41.
135 See MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 373 (1992).
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bring it into accord with the norms defining modem culture. 136 At the
University of Chicago, Shailer Mathews was one of the more influential
liberal religious scholars. 137 His book, The Faith of Modernism,138 was
heralded as "the most widely distributed statement of this new reading of
Christian faith."'139 Mathews believed that evolutionary theory was a part
of the modem views to which Christian beliefs must be conformed. 14° On
the other hand, more conservative Protestants, including the
fundamentalists, worked to find a basis for maintaining the Christian
tradition in the face of modernity.' 41 The result was frustration. Liberals
saw the fundamentalists' efforts as futile and their message as
ineffectual. 42 Mathews captured the frustration that liberals felt towards
fundamentalists when he wrote:
The world needs new control of nature and society and is
told that the Bible is verbally inerrant .... It needs a means
of composing class strife, and is told to believe in the
substitutionary atonement. ... It needs faith in the divine
presence in human affairs and is told it must accept the
virgin birth of Jesus Christ. 143
For Mathews and other liberal theologians like him, the need for
control and social order were the most pressing needs of the age, and he
saw no resources within the traditional Christian worldview for obtaining
what society needed most.'4
Conservative fundamentalists, including J. Gresham Machen who
opposed Mathews, were equally frustrated with the liberal re-interpretation
of Christianity, finding it to be so far removed from tradition that it could
scarcely be called Christian at all.' 45  Even among those who called
themselves fundamentalists, however, there was initially much more
acceptance of the theory of evolution than commonly imagined. Two
important texts bear this out. The Scofield Reference Bible, the most
important fundamentalist interpretation and commentary, 146 allowed in the
136 See id. at 373-76.
137 Id. at 375.
138 SHAILER MATHEWS, THE FAITH OF MODERNISM (J.J. Little Ives & Co. 1925)
(1924).
139 NOLL, supra note 135, at 375.
140 See id. at 375-76.
141 Id. at 383.
142 See id. at 375.
143 Id. at 375-76 (quoting MATHEWS, supra note 138, at 10).
144 See id.
145 See id. at 376.
146 Id. at 378.
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margin commentary that the account of Genesis "refers to the dateless past,
and gives scope for all the geologic ages."' 47 Also, The Fundamentals, an
evangelical journal that existed from 1909 to 1915, published articles
favoring some sort of theistically controlled evolution.14 8  One article,
entitled Science and Christian Faith, dealt explicitly with the theory of
evolution. 49 It states:
Here [in the scriptures] certainly is no detailed description
of the process of the formation of the earth in terms
anticipative of modem science-terms which would have
been unintelligible to the original readers-but a sublime
picture, true to the order of nature, as it is to the broad
facts even in geological succession.
150
These early assessments by fundamentalists did not oppose evolutionary
theories, but saw them as offering a view of nature generally compatible
with the Christian ontology.
151
There was, indeed, a long tradition within Christianity of interpreting
the creation story "figuratively." Augustine of Hippo, one of the early
fathers of the Church, had a clearly established practice of "figurative"
reading. 52 For example, in his The Literal Meaning of Genesis, he writes:
In all the sacred books, we should consider the eternal
truths that are taught, the facts that are narrated, the future
events that are predicted, and the precepts or counsels that
are given. In the case of a narrative of events, the question
arises as to whether everything must be taken according to
the figurative sense only, or whether it must be expounded
and defended also as a faithful record of what happened.
No Christian will dare say that the narrative must not be
taken in a figurative sense. For St. Paul says: Now all
these thing that happened to them were symbolic. And he
explains the statement in Genesis, And they shall be two in
147 THE SCOFIELD REFERENCE BIBLE: THE HOLY BIBLE CONTAINING THE OLD AND
NEW TESTAMENTS 3 n.2 (Rev. C.I. Scofield ed., 1917).
148 See, e.g., George Fredrick Wright, The Passing of Evolution, in THE
FUNDAMENTALS: THE FAMOUS SOURCEBOOK OF FOUNDATIONAL BIBLICAL TRUTHS 613, 613,
616-17 (R.A. Torrey et al. eds., 1990).
149 See James Off, Science and Christian Faith, in THE FUNDAMENTALS: THE
FAMOUS SOURCEBOOK OF FOUNDATIONAL BIBLICAL TRUTHS, supra note 148, at 125-27.
10 Id. at 133.
151 Wright, supra note 148, at 613.
152 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE LITERAL MEANING OF GENESIS 1-2 (John Hammond Taylor
trans., 1982).
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one flesh, as a great mystery in reference to Christ and to
the Church.'53
Augustine actually is not original in this figurative reading of Scripture.
The recognition that at least some passages of scripture cannot be
understood literally extends even to Paul's famous exegesis of the story of
Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar." 4  Since the early response of the
fundamentalists seems to have been following roughly along lines that
Augustine would have accepted as figurative, one is given to wonder what
change occurred that would cause fundamentalists to repudiate
evolutionary theory.
B. Fundamentalist Reaction to Evolutionary Theory After the First World
War
The fundamentalists' initial accommodation of evolutionary theory
seemed to dissolve with the devastation of the First World War.' 5 Similar
to many segments of American society, fundamentalists seem to have
taken the war as an indication that something had gone terribly wrong with
society.156 America had gone to war with great hopes for the war as a
means to bring world peace. 157 The phrase "war to end all wars" was more
than a bit of propaganda dreamed up by militarists to persuade a reluctant
nation; it was a war that was met with enthusiasm by most theological
liberals of the age, who saw in it the hand of God. 15' The historian of
American religion, George Marsden, observes that liberal theologians,
such as Shailer Mathews, who believed that God's providence worked in
and through the "survival of the fittest," saw the war as a great Christian
cause. 59  Mathews captured this view and spirit in his ecstatic
exclamation, "For an American to refuse to share in the present war... is
not Christian."'16  Even the Federal Counsel of Churches, a liberal
Protestant Ecumenical organization 161 of which Mathews was President,
153 Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
'54 See GALATIANS 4:24. For a discussion of the long history of allegorical or
figurative reading of the Christian Scripture, see BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE EARLY
CHURCH 8-23 (Karlfried Froehlich ed. & trans., 1984).
155 See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 909
(1972).
156 See MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 59.
157 AHLSTROM, supra note 155, at 881.
158 See MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 52-53. For a discussion of the Protestant
understanding of the war and reaction to it, see AHLSTROM, supra note 155, at 877-917.
159 MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 51-52.
160 Id. at 52.
161 AHLSTROM, supra note 155, at 803.
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called the nation to war, declarinS "[t]he war for righteousness will be
won! Let the Church do her part."'
This religious crusade to make the world safe for progressive
liberalism ended badly. Of the nearly 65 million soldiers who fought in the
war, over 37 million died, were wounded, or were listed as missing.
63
This crusade for destiny brought human suffering on a scale that was then
unimaginable. The war shook the nation's confidence in progress,
modernization, and technology. 164 Military historian Paul Fussell suggests:
"[The war] was a hideous embarrassment to the prevailing Meliorist myth
which had dominated the public consciousness for a century. It reversed
the Idea of Progress.' 65 He then quotes a letter written by Henry James to
a friend:
The plunge of civilization into this abyss of blood and
darkness .... is a thing that so gives away the whole long
age during which we have supposed the world to be, with
whatever abatement, gradually bettering, that to have to
take it all now for what the treacherous years were all the
while really making for and meaning is too tragic for any
words. 16
6
When the war ended, nearly four million American soldiers returned
home 167 to tell their stories. The crusading fervor gave way to a growing
bitterness.
168
A few social and political leaders opposed the war and were concerned
about the effect that the war and the resulting war debt would have on
labor.169 William Jennings Bryan, the man who prosecuted Scopes, was
one of these. 170 Bryan was one of the leading politicians of the era. He
was nominated three times as the Democratic candidate for the presidency:
in 1896, 1900, and 1908.171 He was a lifelong advocate for the rights of
labor,172 arguing in his famous "cross of gold" speech, an argument against
162 Id. at 884.
163 Spartacus Educational, Casualties: First World War, at http://www.spartacus.-
schoolnet.co.uk/FWWdeaths.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
164 See WHITE, supra note 9, at 181.
165 PAUL FUSSELL, THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 8 (1975).
166 Id.
167 Spartacus Educational, supra note 163.
168 See MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 51.
169 LEVINE, supra note 19, at 29-30.
170 Id. at 30.
171 MARSDEN, supra note 132, at 91.
172 WILLARD H. SMITH, THE SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN 8 (1975).
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unlimited silver coinage given at the 1896 Democratic National
Convention, "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown
of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."'173 From
1913 to 1915, he served as Secretary of State to Woodrow Wilson, and he
urged a pacifist policy that helped to keep the United States out of the First
World War for several years.' T4 He resigned from the post when it became
clear to him that President Wilson was pushing the country to war
enthusiastically.' 75
Bryan mixed his religion and politics.' 76 His pacifism and support for
labor were both part of what he called applied Christianity. 177 By this he
meant that he believed that Christianity provided the principles for public
policy and an approach to public life.'17 One historian recalls:
On one occasion Bryan was asked why Democrats were so
earnest about democracy. He replied that to every
Democrat "who knows what democracy means-it is a
religion, and when you hear a good democratic speech it is
so much like a sermon that you can hardly tell the
difference between them." This was true, Bryan
continued, because a good sermon is built upon the ten
commandments, the sermon on the mount, and the
eleventh commandment: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself." "And a good democratic speech is built upon the
doctrine of human brotherhood, equal rights, and self
government." Though admitting that democracy at times
did not go as far as he would have liked, he optimistically
concluded that when "you get down to bed rock you find
that love of mankind is the basis of both, and democracy
173 KOENIG, supra note 83, at 197.
174 SMITH, supra note 172, at 9, 24.
175 Id. at 4. At a luncheon at the University Club of Washington, D.C., following his
last Cabinet Meeting, Bryan explained to his staff:
I have had to take the course I have chosen.... I cannot go along with
him [Wilson] in this [diplomatic] note. I think it makes for war. I
believe that I can do more on the outside to prevent war than I can do
on the inside. I can work to control popular opinion so that it will not
exert pressure for extreme action which the President does not want.
We both want the same thing, Peace.
Id. (footnote omitted).
176 Id. at 18.
177 Id. at 231.178 See LEVINE, supra note 19, at 358-59.
[33:347
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cap. U. L. Rev.
 366 2004-2005
THE SCOPES MONKEY TRIAL
can never die while there is in democracy a love of
mankind."'
179
His Christian faith was the source of liberalism in social policies,
particularly in his support for labor, and an ardent conservativism in
theology.' 8° He viewed faith in Christ as demanding both.18' Shortly
before his death, he told a reporter, "People often ask me why I can be a
progressive in politics and fundamentalist in religion. The answer is easy.
Government is man made and therefore imperfect .... If Christ is the final
word, how may any one be progressive in religion'?"' 82 This duality in his
thought has lead to a bifurcated view of his life-seeing him as a liberal
radical in his youth and a reactionary conservative in his old age.' 83 But,
this is a distortion, as Lawrence W. Levine has shown in his biographical
work on Bryan's last years. 184 He explains, "In William Jennings Bryan,
reform and reaction lived happily, if somewhat incongruously, side by
side. The Bryan of the 1920's was essentially the Bryan of the 1890's:
older in years but no less vigorous, no less optimistic, no less certain."'
185
Levine argues that Bryan viewed the brutality and devastation of the
war as an outcome of the evolutionary theory that was so influential in
America. 186 But, he failed to make a clear distinction between Darwin's
theory and Spencer's Social Darwinism.187 Bryan saw its influence as
nothing short of demonic, writing in one impassioned speech: "The same
science that manufactured poisonous gases to suffocate soldiers is
preaching that man has a brute ancestry and eliminating the miraculous and
the supernatural from the Bible."'188 He argued that the cruelty implied by
"survival of the fittest" subverted the moral teachings of Christianity. 1'
For Bryan, evolutionary theory was the cause of German aggression. 19°
Three books appear to have confirmed Bryan's assertion. One was Vernon
L. Kellogg's Headquarters Night,191 which gave first-hand accounts of
conversations with German officers, purportedly revealing that the
Darwinian theory of natural selection had played a role in Germany's
179 SMITH, supra note 172, at 19.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 18.
183 Id. at 11.
184 See LEVINE, supra note 19, at 358-65.
185 Id. at vii.
186 Id. at 262-63.
187 See generally id.
188 RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS 41 (1992).
189 Id.
190 d. at 41O42.191 VERNON KELLOGG, HEADQUARTERS NIGHTS (1917).
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decision to declare war. 92  Another book was Benjamin Kidd's The
Science of Power,'93 which attempted to link Darwinian theories to
German militants.' 94 The third was James H. Leuba's The Belief in God
and Immortality,195 which offered statistical evidence that belief in God
was less likely among the college educated.' 6 Bryan saw in these books
evidence that the German acceptance of Darwinism had not only led to the
war, but also led to its merciless destructive force. 197
Bryan, with his national recognition and gift for oratory, became the
leader of the fundamentalist fight against Darwinism and was joined by J.
Gresham Machen and Curtis Lee Laws. 198 Machen had taught at Princeton
Seminary before establishing Westminster Theological Seminary in a
suburb of Philadelphia,'" and Laws had coined the term "fundamentalist"
in 1910 "as a designation for those who were ready 'to do battle royal for
the Fundamentals. ' '' 200 They gathered together to fight the influence of
Darwinism in American society.2°' In the wake of the war, Bryan began a
campaign to eliminate Darwinism in all its forms.
As one of the greatest orators of his time, Bryan turned to the lecture
circuit to mount his attack.20 2 His most popular lecture was "The Menace
of Darwinism," in which he summed up his belief that Darwinism was a
series of "guesses strung together:,
203
The evolutionist guesses that there was a time when eyes
were unknown-that is a necessary part of the hypothesis.
... A piece of pigment, or, as some say, a freckle appeared
upon the skin of an animal that had no eyes. This piece of
pigment or freckle converged the rays of the sun upon that
spot and when the little animal felt the heat on that spot it
turned the spot to the sun to get more heat. The increased
heat irritated the skin-so the evolutionists guess, and a
nerve came there and out of the nerve came the eye!2°4
192 Id.
193 BENiAmiN KIDD, THE SCIENCE OF POWER (1918).
194 Id. at 42.
195 JAMES H. LEUBA, THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY (1916).
196 Id.
197 SMrrH, supra note 172, at 191.
198 NOLL, supra note 135, at 383.
199 Id. at 376.
200 Id. at 382-83.
201 Id.
202 NUMBERS, supra note 188, at 42.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 42-43.
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Bryan was probably aware that the evolution of the eye was a matter of
some concern for Darwin, who realized that he could not offer an account
for it.205 In the Origin of Species, Darwin noted that although the idea that
the eye could have evolved through natural selection seems improbable,
"logical consistency impelled [him] to extend 'the principle of natural
selection to such startling lengths.
Although Bryan's attack was directed against Darwin, it does not
appear that he objected to the distinctively Darwinian elements to
evolutionary theory. Rather, it was the stance that social evolutionary
theories took toward divine action. Obviously, both Darwin's theory and
Spencer's Social Darwinism, which the Lochner Court had adopted, pose
alternative accounts to human origins from the cosmology set out by a
literal interpretation of Genesis. But, it was the policies that Social
Darwinism justified to which Bryan was especially opposed. He claimed
that the "survival of the fittest" mentality gave rise to the ideology he
associated with German aggression, and that was what led him to oppose
the teaching of evolution in the schools. 0 7
Il. THE SCOPES TRIAL
A. The Anti-Evolution Acts
1. Religious Liberty in the 1920s
To understand Bryan's strategy in forming his response to Social
Darwinism, it is helpful to recall that in the 1920s, there was no clear
constitutional bar to requiring the teaching of the Bible in public schools.
During the first half of the twentieth century, the constitutional doctrine of
government neutrality towards religion was in its infancy. The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the bulwark of American
commitment to religious liberty, had not been applied yet to cases
involving citizen suits against a state. Religious liberty was a matter for
the states, and not federal intervention.
Religious rights of individuals living in states were viewed as beyond
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. For example, in Permoli v. City of
New Orleans,208 the Supreme Court held that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a priest who had been fined for
conducting a requiem mass at an unlicensed chapel.2°9 And in Barron v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,21 ° the Court held that the Bill of
205 Id.
206 Id. at 43.
207 See id. at 41.
208 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
209 See id. at 590-91, 610.
210 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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Rights was not to be applied to the states, but merely represented rights of
the people against the federal government. 21' It was not until 1940 in
Cantwell v. Connecticut2?1 2 that the Supreme Court incorporated the First
Amendment against the states, holding that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.213 The Court found that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact
such laws [limiting the free exercise of religion]. 2 a4 Seven years later in
Everson v. Board of Education,1 5 the Court incorporated the establishment
clause against states, holding that "[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa." 216
In the 1920s, issues of religious liberty were therefore still matters of
concern to the states and usually handled in state courts. And only a very
few cases were brought in state courts challenging the establishment of
religion under state constitutions.2 7 Indeed, religious establishments had
218been maintained in several states well into the nineteenth century.
Disestablishment came to Vermont in 1807, Connecticut in 1818, New
Hampshire in 1819, and Massachusetts in 1833.219 So, when Bryan and his
followers organized politically, attempting to bring together those who
resisted modernization at the local level, they saw no clear constitutional
bar to seeking a legislative redress to the threat they perceived.
2. The Anti-Evolution Acts
The Tennessee anti-evolution act was one of several such acts to be
passed in the early part of this century.22° Over twenty state legislatures
debated similar acts, but only three states, Tennessee, Arkansas, and
Mississippi, passed anti-evolution acts.221  Oklahoma passed an act
prohibiting the use of textbooks that taught evolution, and Florida passed a
resolution condemning the teaching of evolution as an immoral act, but not
211 See id. at 250-51.
212 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
213 Id. at 303.
214 Id.
215 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
216 Id. at 16.
217 See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 20 (1990).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 NUMBERS, supra note 188, at 41.
221 Id.
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proscribing it.222 Even the United States Senate debated an act that would
have prohibited evolutionary theory from being discussed on the radio, but
the bill was defeated.223
Tennessee State Senator John A. Shelton introduced an anti-evolution
bill to the Tennessee legislature on January 20, 1925.224 Shelton's act
banned the teaching of evolution in public schools, but did not stipulate the
penalty for the offense.225 Shelton sent a note to Bryan, who thanked him,
but suggested that the act carry no stipulated penalty.226 On the following
day, however, John Washington Butler submitted the revised act, which
stipulated a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $500.227 The bill
was not met with uniform approval, and its opponents tried to amend it to
make it ludicrous.228 One proposal added a prohibition on teaching that the
earth is round.229 The amendment was defeated and the Butler Act passed
easily.230 Governor Austin Peay signed the bill into law, claiming that
although he thought it a necessary statement, he doubted that it would ever
be enforced.23'
Governor Peay was wrong. The American Civil Liberties Union
placed an advertisement in the Daily Times of Chattanooga, promising to
pay the costs of defending anyone willing to challenge the Butler Act.
232
Walter White, the superintendent of the Rhea County schools and president
of the local business association in Dalton, noticed the posting and
considered the prospects of a test case in Dayton. Superintendent White
called an informal meeting of the school board at the local drugstore that
he operated. The board decided to look for a likely candidate to test the
Butler Act, and Scopes' name was mentioned. Scopes happened to come
into the drugstore while they were meeting, and White asked him if he
would stand as defendant in a test case.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 LARSON, supra note 5, at 49.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 50.
228 CAUDILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
229 Id.
230 LARSON, supra note 5, at 50-51.
231 CONKIN, supra note 5, at 81-83.
232 For a discussion of the events leading up to the Scopes trial, see generally
LARSON, supra note 5, at 50-51, 83, 88-90, and CONKIN, supra note 5, at 81-83.
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B. The Trial
John T. Scopes was twenty-four years old, a recent graduate of the
University of Kentucky, and a native of Illinois.233 He had been hired by
the Rhea County School Board to teach physics and math and to coach
football at the Dayton Public High School.2 4 Late in 1924, the regular
biology teacher, W. F. Ferguson, took ill, and Scopes was asked to teach
his class for about two weeks.235 He taught from the biology textbook
supplied by the state, Civil Biology by George W. Hunter.236 The book
contained passages stating that the human species stands at the apex of an
evolutionary series that begins with a single-celled form of life and
proceeds through "ape-like mammals. 237 Scopes had not actually taught
the section of the course that dealt with evolution.238 He had merely
graded the exams of the students that had tested the students on that
topic. 239 Nonetheless, Scopes agreed to stand as defendant, but expressed
his doubts that he could be found to have violated the act since he did not
actually teach evolution in the classroom.240 A dispatch was sent to the
Daily Times, and Scopes was arrested.24' The indictment charged that he
"[taught] in the public schools of Rhea county [Tennessee] a certain theory
that denied the story of the divine creation of man, as taught in the Bible,
and did teach instead thereof that man had descended from a lower order of
animals., 242 The American Civil Liberties Union sent Clarence Darrow, a
well-known attorney and agnostic, to represent Scopes.243 The state asked
Bryan to prosecute Scopes."
The legal issues presented at trial were trivial. Scopes was charged
with violation of a state law that was seen by the trial court as a legitimate
exercise of the state's police powers. Although initially Darrow
challenged the constitutionality of the Butler Act on several theories, the
trial court rejected each of his claims, commenting only that Darrow had
effectively reserved these arguments for appeal. Thus, at the trial, the only
233 CAUDILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
234 Id.
235 CONKIN, supra note 5, at 83.
236 CHARLES MORROW WILSON, THE COMMONER: WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 430
(1970).
237 Id.
238 CONKIN, supra note 5, at 83.
239 Id.
240 LARSON, supra note 5, at 90.
241 Id. at 91.
242 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927).
243 LARSON, supra note 5, at 100.
244 Id.
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issue that the court found to be relevant was the factual question of
whether Scopes had indeed violated the Butler Act. Darrow, planning to
make a constitutional case on appeal, refrained from attacking the obvious
factual inadequacy that Scopes had raised in agreeing to be the
defendant-that is, that by merely grading the students' exams, Scopes had
not actually taught the offending material. Instead, Darrow argued that
what the biology text theorized was more reasonable than the literal
interpretation of the creation story of Genesis. He sought a direct
confrontation between the reasonableness of evolutionary theory and the
fideism of the literal interpretation of the Bible.
To bring this confrontation about, Darrow sought to bring expert
witnesses to the stand to testify about evolution and biblical
interpretation.245 The trial judge, Judge Raulston, ruled that since the
meaning of the Butler Act could be constructed without appeal to special
knowledge, Darrow's experts were irrelevant to the sole factual issue on
trial: did Scopes violate the act.24 Judge Raulston excluded a long list of
expert witnesses whose testimony Darrow sought.247 Darrow then asked
Bryan if he would take the stand as an expert on the Bible.248 Bryan,
perhaps hoping to grandstand, accepted the unusual request. 249 Darrow's
examination turned into a humiliating Socratic dialogue that left Bryan
broken.25°
In his examination of Bryan, Darrow's tactic was to expose Bryan's
ignorance and implicate his fundamentalism as its cause. 25 1 He began with
asking Bryan about Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. 252 Bryan
displayed his ignorance of these traditions with great flourish.253 Then,
Darrow began to question Bryan about the historical truth of the Bible.254
The complete transcript of the event spans many dozens of pages, in which
Darrow attempted to show that the literal interpretation of Genesis is
incoherent.255 Darrow's questioning of Bryan about why the serpent
"crawls on its belly" serves as an illustration of his approach.21 6
245 See CONKIN, supra note 5, at 91.
246 Id. at 92.
247 See id.
248 See CAUDILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 16-17.
251 See KOENIG, supra note 83, at 651.
252 Id. at 650.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 649-51.
255 See id.
256 Id. at 651.
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Darrow: And you believe that is the reason that God made
the serpent to go on his belly after he tempted Eve?...
"And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou
has done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above
every beast of the field; upon thy belly thou shalt go, and
dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life." Do you think
that is why the serpent is compelled to crawl upon his
belly?
Bryan: I believe that.
Darrow: Have you any idea how the snake went before
that time?
Bryan: No, sir.
Darrow: Do you know whether he walked on his tail or
not?
Bryan: No, sir. I have no way to know.
257
Journalists present at the trial reported that at this point a great burst of
laughter arose in the courtroom.258
Bryan: Your honor, I think I can shorten this testimony.
The only purpose Mr. Darrow has is to slur at the Bible.
But I will shorten his question. I will answer it all at once,
and I have no objection in the world.... I want the world
to know that this man, who does not believe in God, is
trying to use a court in Tennessee-
Darrow: I object to that!
Bryan: To slur at it.... and, while it will require time, I
am willing to take it!
Darrow: I object to your statement! .. .I am examining
you on your fool ideas that no intelligent Christian on
earth believes !259
At this point, there was a great commotion in the court.26° One account
recalls how Judge Raulston brought his gavel down and shouted, "Court is
adjourned until nine o'clock tomorrow morning! 261
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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The media quickly chose Darrow as the victor of the exchange, as is
reflected in the description by one eye-witness, Paul Y. Anderson, who
wrote:
Two old men, one eloquent, magnetic and passionate, the
other cold, impassive and philosophical, met as the
champions of these ideas and as remorselessly as the jaws
of a rock crusher upon the crumbling mass of limestone,
one of these old men caught and ground the other between
his massive erudition and his ruthless logic. Let there be
no doubt about that. Bryan was broken, if ever a man was
broken. Darrow never spared him. It was masterly, but it
was pitiful.
262
When Bryan died several days later from unspecified causes, the media
took his death to be caused by an apoplectic response to the trial. 263 H. L.
Mencken wrote, "Upon [Darrow's cruel] hook, in truth, Bryan committed
suicide, as a legend as well as in the body. He staggered from the rustic
court ready to die, and he staggered from it ready to be forgotten, save as a
character in a third-rate farce, witless and in poor taste.' 26
There is arbitrariness about this. Had Bryan survived, or if it had been
Darrow who had died and Bryan who had lived, the trial might be
remembered differently. No formal determination was made of the cause
of Bryan's death, but it seems unlikely that it was caused by the
psychological trauma of the trial.265 Larson reports that in the few days he
had remaining in his life, Bryan was undeterred in his anti-evolution stance
and, indeed, had renewed his offensive.266  The day following his
examination by Darrow, Bryan issued a press statement arguing the
following: "The issue is so large that individuals and locations are
relatively unimportant .... Is the Bible true is the question raised by the
Tennessee law, and that question is answered in the affirmative as far as
this trial can answer it."26 And he turned Darrow's aggressiveness against
the cause of evolutionary theory, arguing that it showed the moral decay268
that evolutionary theory wrought. Finally, acknowledging that he had
been undermined by the clever Darrow, Bryan argued, "Evolution
overestimates the influence of the mind on life and underestimates the
262 L. SPRAGUE DE CAMP, THE GREAT MONKEY TRIAL 413 (1968).
263 See id. at 439.
264 H.L. Mencken, In Memoriam: W.J.B., BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, July 27, 1925,
reprinted in THE VINTAGE MENCKEN 165 (Alistair Cooke ed., 1955).
265 See DE CAMP, supra note 262, at 439.
266 See LARSON, supra note 5, at 197-99.
267 Id. at 197-98.
268 Id. at 198.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cap. U. L. Rev.
 375 2004-2005
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
influence of the heart., 269 Darrow also thought that his examination of
Bryan was unrelated to Bryan's death.27 ° When news of Bryan's death
reached Darrow while he was vacationing in the Smoky Mountains, he
reportedly told a reporter that he thought Bryan had "died of a busted
belly," a reference to Bryan's famed overeating.27' If Bryan, an
accomplished politician who had suffered many political defeats in his
long career, lived to continue this rhetoric, the case might be remembered
differently than it is. Nonetheless, by this accident of history, Bryan's
death contributed to the meaning of the trial in the popular imagination.
The Scopes trial came to an end on the day following the examination
of Bryan.272 Darrow rested his defense and the case went to the jury.273 In
his closing remarks, Darrow told the jury that he planned to make an
appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, but could only do so with a
conviction.274 He asked the jury to find his client guilty so that the issue
could be taken up in the higher forum.275 Scopes was then convicted at the
request of his lawyer.276
C. The Appeal
Scopes appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Supreme Court.27 7
The arguments raised by Scopes' attorneys on appeal challenged a number
of aspects of the Butler Act. 278 One argument questioned the validity of
the Butler Act on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and a parallel clause in the
Tennessee Constitution.279 The court found little merit in the claim.
280
Relying on a number of United States Supreme Court decisions, the
Tennessee Supreme Court found that Scopes was under contract with the
state and "had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such
terms as the state prescribed. His liberty, his privilege, his immunity to
269 Id. at 198.
270 Id. at 200.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 190-91.
273 Id. at 191.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 192.
277 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927). Darrow did not participate in
the appeal, largely because some "blamed Darrow for the failure of the Scopes defense to
stem the tide of fundamentalism." LARSON, supra note 5, at 206.
278 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363.
279 Id. at 364.
280 Id.
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teach and proclaim the theory of evolution, elsewhere than in the service of
the state, was in no wise touched by this law."'2 '
Relying on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
Lochner v. New York, the Tennessee Supreme Court asserted that the
principle of Due Process requires courts to do no more than maintain and
protect natural rights: the right to own property and freedom of contract.
282
In this view, the Due Process Clause exists to ensure that the political
branches of government do not interfere with the ownership of property or
the freedom to enter contracts on whatever terms one might wish.283 Such
political interference with these natural rights was deemed by the courts to
interfere with the workings of the forces of nature, and thus interfering
284with social progress. Political interference with natural rights, then, was
the equivalent to interference with the natural evolution of the species-
since natural rights were the very instruments of natural selection of social
groups-and the principle of Due Process is the constitutional bulwark
against tampering with natural selection of social groups.
The Tennessee Supreme Court thus saw the relationship between
Scopes and the State as a product of the natural right of freedom of
contract.285 Citing one of the Lochner prodigies, Atkin v. Kansas,286 the
court explained:
It cannot be deemed a part of the liberty of any contractor
that he be allowed to do public work in any mode he may
choose to adopt, without regard to the wishes of the state.
On the contrary, it belongs to the state, as the guardian and
trustee for its people, and having control of its affairs, to
prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit public
work to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of its
municipalities. No court has authority to review its action
in that respect. Regulations on this subject suggest only
considerations of public policy. And with such
287
considerations the courts have no concern.
The Tennessee Supreme Court saw the State of Tennessee as merely
presenting a condition on the employment of Scopes and other public
school teachers-that they refrain from teaching evolution.288 By entering
281 Id.
282 Id. at 367; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
283 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
284 See id. at 63-64.
285 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 364.
286 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
287 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 365 (quoting Atkins, 191 U.S. at 222-23).
288 Id.
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into such a contract, Scopes and the State had agreed to the terms of public
employment, and the value of those terms of employment would be
determined by unencumbered competition. 289 That is, the State simply set
a condition on the employment of Scopes and other public school teachers,
and if such a legislative effort should prove disadvantageous, the forces of
natural selection will drive it from the field.29 ° Presumably, this would
mean that other legislators would be elected to address and correct the
disadvantage.29' If the court were to oversee such actions of the
legislature, it would mean interfering with the working of natural
selection.292
Another argument advanced by Scopes relied on a portion of the
Tennessee Constitution that mandated that the General Assembly "cherish
literature and science. 293  The court likened the duty that this clause
imposed on the General Assembly to a private trust.294 It noted that under
existing case law, "[i]f a bequest were made to a private trustee with the
avails of which he should cherish science, and there was nothing more,
such a bequest would be void for uncertainty. 295 By analogy, the court
argued that it was powerless to restrain the General Assembly on such a
vague requirement. Moreover, the court argued that it could not imagine
any circumstance under which it would consider whether the state
legislature had satisfied the obligation:
If the Legislature thinks that, by reason of popular
prejudice, the cause of education and the study of science
generally will be promoted by forbidding the teaching of
evolution in the schools of the state, we can conceive of no
ground to justify the court's interference. The courts
cannot sit in judgment on such acts of the Legislature or its
agents and determine whether or not the omission or
addition of a particular course of study tends "to cherish
,,297science.
Next, the court addressed the claim that the Butler Act violated section
3 of article 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, which read in relevant part
"that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious
289 Id.
290 Id. at 367.
291 Id.
292 See id.
293 id. at 366.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
[33:347
HeinOnline  -- 33 Cap. U. L. Rev.
 378 2004-2005
establishment or mode of worship." 298 The court expressed its belief that
this section was drafted into the state constitution in order to prevent any
state establishment of religion in Tennessee, but in its analysis of the
relationship between evolution and institutionalized religious beliefs, as
they were then practiced in Tennessee, the court concluded:
We are not able to see how the prohibition of teaching the
theory that man has descended from a lower order of
animals gives preference to any religious establishment or
mode of worship ...So far as we know, the denial or
affirmation of such a theory does not enter into any
recognized mode of worship.
The court refused to consider the intent of the General Assembly, stating
emphatically, "[T]he validity of a statute must be determined by its natural
and legal effect, rather than proclaimed motives.,, 300 Thus, the court
argued that a statute should be evaluated by its effects rather than by the
legislative intent.301 The Scopes court cited Lochner for this proposition,
noting that, in Lochner, the Supreme Court stated that it was not
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the legislature of the State of
New York.3 °2 The reason for this is that the courts must be the guardians
of rights, and therefore they must be concerned with the effects of
legislative enactments on natural rights.
Finally, the court stated the rationale for reversing the conviction of
Scopes.303 The court found that the fine of $100, which Judge Raulston
had imposed, violated section 14, article 6 of the Tennessee Constitution,
which required that all fines greater than $50 be imposed by a jury. °4 The
court further argued that since Scopes had left his teaching position and
was no longer in the service of the state, nothing could "be gained by
prolonging the life of this bizarre case., 30 5 The court went on to state, "We
think the peace and dignity of the state, which all criminal prosecutions are
brought to redress, will be the better conserved by the entry of a nolle
298 Id. (quoting TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 3).
299 Id. at 367.
300 Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Grainger v. Douglas Park
Jockey Club, 148 F. 513 (1906)).
301 Id.
302 See id.
303 See id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
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prosequi herein.,,306 The prosecution agreed to the court's request and
withdrew the indictment of Scopes, thereby ending the case.
307
D. Subsequent Influence of the Trial
As a matter of formal legal precedent, the Scopes case is of little
consequence. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the penalty imposed
by the trial court, but affirmed the validity of the anti-evolution act, stating
that it was a valid and enforceable legislative act within the strictures of
both the state and federal constitutions. As a matter of formal legal
precedent, the Scopes case should stand for the constitutional validity of
anti-evolution acts.
When later courts have cited to the Scopes case, however, it has not
been for its formal holding. Rather it has been cited in the context of
furthering arguments against religious establishment. That is, later courts
refer to the Scopes case as persuasive, not in its formal legal holding, but
for the popular memory of Darrow's examination of Bryan. Of course this
sort of testimony is not usually considered relevant to legal precedent or to
the authoritative meaning of the case. But, this disjunction between formal
legal meaning and informal cultural memory seems lost to the later courts.
For example, the Scopes case is cited by the United States Supreme Court
in its opinion in Epperson v. Arkansas,3 °8 which held that an Arkansas
statute nearly identical to the Butler Act was an unconstitutional violation
of the First Amendment.3° Justice Abe Fortas, writing for the majority in
Epperson, mentions that the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Butler Act in the Scopes case,310 but nevertheless
cites to Darrow's autobiography to illustrate the inconsistency of the
fundamentalist reading of the creation account.31' What Justice Fortas
finds persuasive is Darrow's recollection that the fundamentalists were not
opposed to teaching that the world is round.312 And later in the opinion,
Justice Fortas suggests that Arkansas drafted its anti-evolution act in a less
inflammatory manner in response to the "sensational publicity" that the
Scopes trial had produced, but he ignores the holding of the Tennessee
Supreme Court.
306 Id. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry into the record by a prosecutor that a case
will not be prosecuted by the state. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 945 (5th ed. 1979).
307 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 367.
308 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
309 See id. at 109.
310 Id. at 98.
31 Id. at 98, 102 n.9.
312 See id. at 102 n.9.
313 Id. at 109.
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Similarly, in the 1975 case Daniel v. Waters,3t 4 a Tennessee statute
that banned public school textbooks teaching evolution was overturned by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 315 In the course of its analysis, the
court cites to the Scopes appeal, noting that the trial was a celebrated case,
and then asserts that "the purpose of establishing the Biblical version of the
creation of man over the Darwinian theory of the evolution of man is as
clear in 1973 as it was in the statute of 1925. ' '316 Again, the court ignored
the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion and refused to look at the
legislative purpose in enacting the Butler Act. Nevertheless, the parallel
that the court seems to be drawing here is that, just as the Butler Act was
motivated by a purpose that it would proscribe, so too with the 1973 act.
Clearly, the Daniel court is also using the popular memory of the Scopes
trial rather than looking to the precedent.3  Finally, in Aguillard v.
Edwards,318 which involved a Louisiana anti-evolution act, the court cites
to the Scopes appeal as the "celebrated Scopes trial in 1927" that sparked
what the court calls "the fundamentalist fires. 3 19
It appears from these cases that two sorts of meanings have become
attached to the case: a formal legal meaning defined by the operation of the
rules of legal precedent, and a meaning that is reflected in the way the
Scopes trial is remembered by Justice Fortas and subsequent courts. This
later meaning holds the case as a symbol of the incoherence of the
fundamentalists' position, but these latter uses of the case seem to have lost
awareness that it was Darrow's examination of Bryan and Bryan's death
that were the formative elements in the way that the case was popularly
understood. Rather, the case becomes one in which science exposed the
ignorance and bigotry of fundamentalism, although there is actually very
little in the record that shows this.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that a more complete understanding of the
historical background of the Scopes case and, in particular, the life and
thought of William Jennings Bryan, provides deeper insight into the forces
that shaped and gave rise to this milepost in American legal history. It has
suggested that while Bryan, and other fundamentalists like him, raised little
protest against evolutionary theory in the late nineteenth century, after the
314 515 F.2d 485 (1975).
315 See id. at 486-88, 491-92.
316 Id. at 487.
317 See also Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Porter, 485 F.
Supp. 432, 433 (1980); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F.
Supp. 1172, 1191 (1979).
318 765 F.2d 1251 (1985).
319 Id. at 1253.
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First World War they organized against it. Bryan saw the war, as did many
of the survivors, as an indication that modernity and progressive
aspirations were somehow fundamentally flawed. And, while Bryan
would remain hopeful about the future, he came to see evolutionary theory
as an impediment to social justice and peace. Spurred on by anti-German
sentiments that followed the war, Bryan led a crusade against evolutionary
theory, but he was motivated less by concern over inerrant literalism in
reading the scripture than he was by the harsh affects that Social
Darwinism and laissez-faire economics had had on labor, the poor, and the
disadvantaged.
This study of Scopes suggests that the case offers a window on an
interesting age in American law, which bears further study. During this
crucial period of American legal history, the basis for much of our
contemporary legal theory was being grounded. We see, for example, the
beginnings of reactions against Legal Formalism, questions about the
German idealism of Kant and Hegel, and the origins of broader awareness
of the forces involved in legal disputes, which would eventually lead to
Legal Realism. All of this suggests that further research in the period
would provide deeper insight into our own time.
The case also suggests that understanding the religious history of the
period will enhance understanding of the legal history. Though often
confused and obscured in theological rhetoric, the statements of religious
leaders of the time capture some of the frustrations, fears, hopes, and
aspirations of the people. In the 1920s, this was particularly true for labor
and the poor. This suggests that further research into the religious thought
and history will add context and deepen the understanding of the nature of
change in legal history. This is perhaps more true in the past than it is
today. Nonetheless, it seems clear that a better understanding of religious
thinking would yield insight into this period, which is formative for
contemporary legal thought. Thus, we stand to gain a better understanding
of our more secular age by better understanding the religious beliefs that
contributed to contemporary thought.
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